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1. Introduction
This chapter will basically aim at understanding, explaining and analyzing the 
foreign policy orientation of Turkey in the transboundary waters context. Turkey’s 
state practices include a rich history of treaty practices, as well as political statements 
and actions which culminated in regional water governance trends displaying 
consensus, but in most cases disagreements. The chapter will analyze how 
harmonization with the European Union (EU) has had impacts on the transboundary 
water policy discourses and practices in Turkey, and how these changes have 
been reflected in the country’s relations with its neighbors in the Middle East. The 
Orontes River Basin is presented as a case-study with its geographical features and 
hydro-political history. In this context, transboundary water politics in the Orontes 
will be examined with its entrenched complexities. The chapter will focus on the 
divergent views of Syria and Turkey over the Orontes, the cooperation initiatives 
taken in the last decade, specifically the proposed “Friendship Dam” project which 
came to a standstill after the civil war in Syria and consequent deterioration of 
relations between Turkey and Syria. The chapter will also briefly present the need 
for a reappraisal of the transboundary water management practices in the basin so 
that they would favor greater participation of stakeholders which have traditionally 
been excluded in the region, such as women. 
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2. Turkish foreign policy and water
Turkey’s water policy aims at achieving a number of fundamental objectives, 
such as increasing agricultural production and food security; meeting 
the increasing demand for drinking water in rural and urban areas as well 
as in the industrial sector; decreasing dependency on imported energy 
sources; diminishing the regional, economic and social discrepancies 
in the country; and increasing the welfare of the society. Transboundary 
water policies have been formulated at the national level in conformity with 
these strategic objectives. According to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, which carries the primary responsibility for formulation as well as 
implementation of transboundary water policy, Turkey’s policy regarding the 
use of transboundary rivers is based on the following principles (Ministry of 
Forestry and Water Affairs, 2013):
• “Water is a basic human need.
• Transboundary rivers are elements of cooperation rather than a reason for 
conflict.
• Each riparian state of a transboundary river system has the sovereign right 
to make use of the water in its territory. 
• Riparian states must make sure that their utilization of such waters does 
not give significant harm to others. 
• Transboundary waters should be used in an equitable, reasonable and 
optimum manner. 
• Equitable use does not mean the equal distribution of waters of a 
transboundary river among riparian states.
• The objective of transboundary water cooperation should be sharing the 
benefits of transboundary waters.
• Transboundary water disputes should be settled between the riparians 
and mediation attempts of third parties should not be supported. 
• Transboundary water use and allocation should be conducted with a 
consideration of natural hydrological and meteorological conditions. 
Accordingly, the risks of droughts should be shared between the co-riparians. 
Under such variable hydrological and climatic conditions, water sharing 
cannot be settled on the basis of fixed numbers or quantities. 
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• Turkey is ready to share its experiences, technology and human resources 
capacity with its neighbors in building hydroelectric power stations, dams 
and other water infrastructure including irrigation and drinking water 
systems.” 
and for the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers in particular:
• “The two rivers constitute a single basin. 
• The combined water potential of the Euphrates and the Tigris Rivers is, in 
the view of the Turkish authorities, sufficient to meet the needs of the three 
riparians provided that water is used in an efficient way and the benefit is 
maximized through new irrigation technologies and the principle of “more 
crop per drop” at basin level. 
• The variable natural hydrological and meteorological conditions must be 
taken into account in the allocation of the waters of the Euphrates and the 
Tigris Rivers. 
• The principle of sharing the benefits at basin level should be pursued. 
• Turkey is ready to negotiate all aspects of the Euphrates and Tigris waters. 
In this context, as a token of goodwill, Turkey is providing data and 
information to the neighboring countries upon their request. Yet, data 
exchange should be carried out mutually and at the basin level.”
According to the Ministry of Forestry and Water Affairs, Turkey’s transboundary 
water policy is furthermore formulated by taking into consideration the 
priorities of the country with respect to its economic and social development 
needs, as well as the framework of the accession negotiations with the 
European Union (EU) (Ministry of Forestry and Water Affairs, 2013).  
Water has become an issue in Turkish foreign policy in the 1980s with the 
planning and building of a series of large-scale dams and giant irrigation 
projects in the Euphrates-Tigris River Basin within the context of the 
Southeastern Anatolia Development Project, also known as the GAP project, 
with a view to achieving social and economic development in the country. 
History and geography, the main factors that determine a country’s foreign 
policy, have played a key role in the formulation of the transboundary water 
policy. In this context, since the first years of the Republic the state of affairs in 
the relations with the neighboring states has determined the main framework 
for transboundary water policy. On the other hand, the Cold War period, 
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which influenced Turkey’s regional and bilateral relations with its neighbors, 
has also directly affected its transboundary water policies. In that period, 
the damaging impact of the Cold War has played a negative role in failing to 
develop fruitful relations with Syria, Iraq and Bulgaria over the waters of the 
Orontes, Euphrates-Tigris, and Meric/Maritsa Rivers, respectively.   
Nevertheless, since the early years of the Republic, Turkey has adopted a foreign 
policy of developing institutional structures with its neighbors by conducting 
negotiations, signing treaties and establishing temporary or permanent 
technical committees, using the instruments of diplomacy and international 
law. For instance, the Arpacay Dam jointly constructed with Armenia, the 
1987 Protocol signed with Syria as an (interim) agreement for sharing the 
waters of the Euphrates River and a series of protocols and agreements signed 
with Bulgaria – all of which were in the “enemy” camp during the Cold War 
period – bear witness  to Turkey’s determination to adopt a peaceful approach 
in the disputes with its neighbors over the transboundary water resources as 
envisaged in the United Nations Charter as well as in customary law. 
The geographical characteristics of Turkey have played a key role in defining 
its transboundary water policy. In Turkey, the tributaries of the Meric/Maritsa, 
Coruh, Orontes, Euphrates-Tigris and Aras Rivers are classified as transboundary 
waters or waters which constitute boundaries.1 The drainage basins of these 
rivers have a total extension of 256,000 km2, representing one third of Turkey’s 
total surface area. The average water potential of these rivers inside Turkey 
is 70 billion cubic meters per year, which is equivalent to 30% of the overall 
water potential of the country. Turkey occupies the upstream position on the 
Euphrates-Tigris, Coruh and Aras Rivers, and the downstream position on the 
Meric/Maritsa and Orontes Rivers. It has land borders of 2,753 km length with 
its neighbors, namely Greece, Bulgaria, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Iran, 
Iraq and Syria, and the above-mentioned rivers represent 22% of these borders. 
Transboundary rivers constitute 30% of Turkey’s fresh water resources. 
1 Rivers that originate from the territory of a sovereign country and flow into the territory of other 
countries by crossing the borders are categorized as transboundary rivers, whereas rivers that flow 
along the borders of two or more countries and thus constitute the border between these countries 
are categorized as international rivers.  
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Moreover, Turkey’s arable and irrigable lands are located in these river basins, 
for instance the Euphrates-Tigris River Basin covers 20% of Turkey’s irrigable 
lands. Hence, taking into consideration the conditions of the urban and rural 
population in these basins as well as the population growth and the increasing 
living standards, geographical factors clearly stand out in the formulation of 
the transboundary water policies.  
2.1 Institutional development in transboundary water policy-making 
The fundamental foreign policy principles regarding transboundary water 
resources have been established and bureaucratically institutionalized in 
Turkey – especially since the 1980s – within the framework of the conditions 
shaped by the physical as well as human geography under the influence of 
the global, regional and bilateral relations that evolved in the second half 
of the 20th century. In addition to the direct role played by considerations of 
national political and economic interests, the formulation of these principles 
was influenced by international water law and international politics. 
With the increasing impact of the GAP (Southeastern Anatolia Project) in 
the international arena, a bureaucratic structure has evolved since the 1980s 
where the principles and policies with regard to the transboundary waters 
have been determined. A department in charge of regional and transboundary 
waters which is responsible for issues pertaining to energy, water and the 
environment has been formed within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, under 
the Directorate General. Moreover, relevant state institutions, providing 
ample technical information, such as the status of water resources in terms of 
quality and quantity, as well as institutions responsible for the development, 
management and preservation of water resources are expected to work in 
conjunction with the Foreign Ministry in the formulation of the fundamental 
principles of foreign (water) policy. First and foremost among these institutions 
is the State Hydraulic Works (Turkish acronym, DSI), which is responsible for 
the development and administration of Turkey’s water resources since 1954. 
The DSI has accomplished a series of projects for energy, drinking water, 
irrigation, flood control and drought management especially in the GAP 
region. Its mandate included the collection of data pertaining to the quality 
and the quantity of the surface and groundwater resources in 25 river basins 
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in Turkey, as well as the planning, implementation and management of the 
projects aiming at meeting the water demand for drinking usage, and for use 
in agriculture, industry, energy and related sectors. As such, it has provided 
important inputs to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the formulation of the 
principles of transboundary water policy, despite the fact that its tasks have 
recently been partially taken over by the private sector, stakeholders (irrigation 
associations) and other state institutions.    
On the other hand, a development agency, namely the Southeastern Anatolia 
Project Regional Development Administration (GAP RDA), which is responsible 
for the coordination and for the effective and equitable implementation of socio-
economic development projects in the GAP region, initiated transboundary 
cooperation in the field of water based development, which paved the way 
for new openings in transboundary water policy. Hence, in 2001, a Joint 
Communiqué was signed between the GAP RDA under the Prime Ministry of 
Turkey and the General Organization for Land Development (GOLD) under the 
Syrian Ministry of Irrigation.2 The GAP RDA-GOLD cooperation is based on the 
common understanding of the sustainable use of the region’s land and water 
resources through joint rural development and environmental protection 
projects, joint training programs, exchanges of experts and technology and 
study missions. In the course of 2001 and 2002, Syrian and Turkish delegations 
visited each other’s development project sites. During these contacts the two 
sides had opportunities to exchange experience of positive and negative impacts 
of water and land resource development projects dating back several decades. 
Once again, the water issue was relegated to the technical level, as in the 1960s, 
and left to intergovernmental networks composed of technocrats. However, 
unlike the technical negotiations in the 1960s, the GAP-GOLD dialogue 
covered such disparate issues as urban and rural water quality management, 
rural development, participatory irrigation management and agricultural 
research. Even though the dialogue between these two leading institutions has 
2 A joint Communiqué between the Republic of Turkey, Prime Ministry, Southeastern Anatolia 
Project Regional Development Administration (GAP) and the Arab Republic of Syria, Ministry of 
Irrigation, General Organization for Land Development, 23 August 2001, Ankara, Turkey (file in 
possession of the authors). 
Turkey’s foreign policy orientation
in the water context and the Orontes Basin
[ 63 ]
not resulted in concrete project implementation or regular exchange programs, 
it has served as a semi-formal consultation mechanism and paved the way for 
initiatives taken by other government departments and agencies in 2008 and 
2009 with the similar objective of solving transboundary water problems within 
a broader framework of political, economic and social development. 
Turkey’s water policies towards its neighbors, namely Europe, the Middle East 
and the Caucasus, and its regional role have been changing considerably. 
Among these, evolving relations with the European Union (EU) within the 
framework of ongoing accession negotiations have significantly transformed 
the Turkish water sector. The goal of EU accession implies that Turkey is 
obliged to adopt and implement the entire body of European Environmental 
Law, covering many far reaching legal requirements (for example, the 
Water Framework Directive with significant implications for the member 
states’ international water cooperation) as well as a couple of international 
environmental agreements where the EU is the contracting party. In the EU-
Turkey accession partnership, the transboundary water issue has already 
been identified as a priority issue in a series of Progress Reports issued by the 
European Commission. In this perspective, Turkey has adopted a number of 
laws and by-laws on environmental protection and water quality management 
in the domestic, agricultural and industrial sectors since the mid-2000s. This 
legal reorientation has been basically guided by the European Union’s water 
legislation within the framework of the accession process. 
Hence, since the beginning of Turkey’s candidacy for EU membership in the early 
2000s, the Ministry of the Environment and Forestry (MoEF)3 has taken initiatives 
to pass the necessary legislation with a view to striking a balance between the 
use and the protection of water resources, thus contributing to the formulation 
of transboundary water policies. The new approaches developed by the Ministry 
of the Environment and Forestry within the framework of the relations with the 
European Union have played a key role in the Memoranda of Understandings 
(MoU) signed with Syria and Iraq in 2009 regarding the use, development and 
protection of water resources (Kibaroglu and Scheumann, 2013).
3 In June 2011, the MoEF was reorganised taking the name of Ministry of Forestry and Water Affairs. 
See: http://www.ormansu.gov.tr.
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The concepts used in these MoUs, such as “river basin level water management”, 
“establishing emission standards”, “polluter-pays” and “cost-recovery 
principles” reflect the terminology employed in the EU Water Framework 
Directive (2000), the legal document constituting the basis for the EU water 
policies. Therefore, the MoEF staff in particular vigorously sustained these 
protocols because they felt that these would be useful in supporting the 
implementation and extension of the new water legislation in Turkey in the 
transposition process of the EU water legislation4. The EU’s water management 
approach which is formulated at the “river basin level” in its Water Framework 
Directive of 2000 will not only be applied in Turkey’s national river basins but 
also in its transboundary river basins such as the Euphrates-Tigris and Orontes. 
Moreover, common standards for measuring water quantity (gauging) and 
monitoring transboundary water quality are among MoEF’s main objectives 
in its cooperation with Syria and Iraq. In this context, one of the main aims 
of the Turkish bureaucracy has been to establish environmental quality 
standards and to implement the polluter-pays and cost-recovery principles at 
transboundary level, as stipulated in the relevant MoU5.
In the same manner, relevant ministries directly responsible for the technical 
aspects of the issue have been involved in the formulation of transboundary 
water policies, in addition to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, one of the 
primary actors in the country’s policy-making. This is a dramatically different 
approach than the one adopted in the negotiations pursued with Syria and 
Iraq in the Euphrates-Tigris River Basin since the 1980s. Unlike the agenda 
of the diplomatic negotiations in the past, this approach focuses on the use 
and management of the water resources without necessarily mentioning the 
sharing and allocation of water resources.
4  Since the mid 2000s Turkey adopted a number of laws and by-laws on environmental protection 
and water quality management in the domestic, agricultural and industrial sectors. This legal 
reorientation has been basically guided by the European Union’s water legislation within the 
framework of the accession process.
5  The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the Government of the Republic of Turkey 
and the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic in the Field of Remediation of Water Quality, 23 
December 2009.
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3. The Orontes River Basin
3.1 Geographic and hydrologic features 
The Orontes River rises in the karstic springs of Al-Labweh, Ain Zarka and 
Daffash in the northern Bekaa region of Lebanon near the city of Baalbek 
at an altitude of 690 m. Also known as Asi Nehri in Turkish and Nahr-al Asi 
in Arabic, the Orontes is the only river in Western Asia that flows north and 
drains west into the Mediterranean (UN-ESCWA and BGR, 2013). The Orontes 
enters the Syrian territory near the Lebanese town of Hermel, it then passes 
through the cities of Homs and Hamah, crosses the fertile Al-Ghab region 
where intensive irrigation systems have been established, and defines 56 km 
of the Syrian-Turkish border (Korkmaz and Karatas, 2009: 21)6 before entering 
into Turkey. The river turns southwest in Turkey, passing through Antakya 
and discharging into the Mediterranean Sea near Samandag in the Turkish 
province of Hatay.
The data concerning total length and catchment area of the Orontes River 
vary according to the different sources. Most of the sources mention a length 
between 448 and 571 km. A recent study using Google Earth images at an 
altitude of 2,000 m calculated a total length of 556 km, of which 40 km lie in 
Lebanon, 366 km in Syria and 98 km in Turkey (Korkmaz and Karatas, 2009: 
21).7 While data on the catchment area fluctuate between 17,000 km2 and 37,900 
km2, Korkmaz and Karatas (2009), using Arc Map v. 9.2, calculated the actual 
catchment area of the Orontes as 21,743 km2. According to this study, 26% of 
the catchment area is situated in Turkey, 67% in Syria and 7% in Lebanon.8 The 
Orontes has two main tributaries: the Afrin River, which has a larger water 
6 25 km, according to UN-ECSWA and BGR (2013: 228), and 32 km according to Caponera (1993: 
630).
7 These figures are contested by several other studies including UN-ECSWA and BGR, which report 
that the total length of the river system is 404 km. Bazza and Najib (2003: 7), on the other hand, 
argues that the total length is 485 km, of which 336 km in Syria.
8 According to UN-ECSWA and BGR (2013: 224), based on the study by Lehner et al. (2008) on 
topography and stream network of the Orontes drainage area, the catchment covers an area of 
26,530 km2, shared by Syria, Turkey and Lebanon respectively by 67%, 25%, and 8%. Aquastat and 
FAO, on the other hand, refer to a catchment area of 24,660 km2 (69% in Syria, 23% in Turkey, 8% in 
Lebanon) (Aquastat, 2008: 1). 
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flow, and the Karasu River. The Afrin River originates in the Turkish Kartal 
Mountains, it flows south through the city of Afrin in Syria and then re-enters 
Turkey, draining into the Amik Lake. The Karasu River runs almost entirely 
through Turkey except forming a small section of the Turkish-Syrian border. 
The combined mean annual discharge potential of the Orontes River including 
its tributaries is estimated at 2.4 to 2.8 billion cubic meters (BCM), representing 
a flow of 75.7-88.3 m3 per second (Comair et al., 2013).9 The mean annual flow 
volume measured near Hermel in Lebanon is 0.41 BCM. At Syria’s Al-Omeiry 
station close to the Lebanese border, however, the mean annual flow volume 
decreases to 0.2 BCM, indicating the intensive water use for irrigation in the 
region concerned (UN-ESCWA and BGR, 2013: 231). The average yearly flow 
potential at the point of entry into Turkey is estimated at 1.4 BCM for the 
Orontes, 0.6 BCM for the Afrin and 0.4 BCM for the Karasu (Scheumann et 
al., 2011: 303). However, during summer months the Orontes dries up before 
reaching Turkey due to extensive water use in Syria’s Al-Ghab region (Baran 
et al., 2006: 576). 
The Orontes system is mainly fed by groundwater (around 90%) which is 
dependent upon the snow cover in the Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon Mountains 
(UN-ESCWA and BGR, 2013: 231). Spring snowmelt constitutes the peak flow in 
the system. Groundwater discharge due to snowmelt continues to maintain river 
flow during dry summer seasons. Another period of high river flow appears 
during the winter months due to increased rainfall. As a result of Mediterranean 
climate characteristics, the Orontes River Basin annually receives 400-500 mm 
of rainfall most of which occurring during winter season. 
3.2 Water development and use by the riparians
While the water resources of the Orontes River and its tributaries are 
intensively used by all riparians for irrigation purposes and for domestic and 
industrial water uses, the irrigation by Syria and Turkey constitutes by far the 
greatest usage, of which the demand occasionally exceeds the supply of the 
river system. In 2009, FAO estimated the total irrigated area in the basin at 
9 An earlier study by DSI gives an annual discharge of 3.4 BCM (DSI, 1958: 24). Therefore, the annual 
water potential of the Orontes river system dropped considerably in the last several decades.
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300,000 to 350,000 ha, of which 58% situated in Syria, 36% in Turkey and 6% 
in Lebanon. Beside the issue of quantity, one of the prominent concerns over 
the Orontes waters is the water quality caused by polluting discharges in the 
Syrian part of the basin creating significant problems in downstream Turkey. 
This section elaborates the current status of water development and use in the 
Orontes Basin.
3.2.1 Upstream (Lebanon) 
Despite the fact that the headwaters of the Orontes are located within Lebanese 
territory,  the utilization of its water resources in Lebanon is hitherto mostly 
confined to small-scale farming, fish farms and tourism activities (UN-ESCWA 
and BGR, 2013: 234), with an annual total use of 21 million cubic meters 
(MCM). The bilateral water-sharing agreement on the Orontes River, signed 
in 1994 between Lebanon and Syria, stipulates that Lebanon’s annual share 
amounts to 80 MCM, out of 420 (or 510) MCM.10   While the agricultural sector 
is the largest consumer of water, accounting for 77% of the total use, domestic 
water use amounts to 23%. 
According to FAO estimates, 18,000-21,000 ha are irrigated in the Lebanese 
part of the Orontes Basin. These figures are to be increased when the Assi 
irrigation scheme will be operational. The Assi scheme project is divided into 
two phases and includes two dams with a total capacity of 64 MCM, as well as 
a number of pumping stations and irrigation networks which will irrigate an 
additional 6,800 ha in the Hermel and Al Qaa regions. The Assi scheme also 
aims at creating 50 MW of hydroelectricity and providing water for domestic 
use in Baalbek and Hermel.
The water quality in the Lebanese part of the Orontes is relatively good, given 
the low level of pollutants originating from agricultural, industrial or domestic 
water use.
3.2.2 Midstream (Syria)
Syria is the major user of the Orontes water resources, accounting for 90% 
10  The FAO Aquastat Database estimates surface water flow to Syria at 510 MCM/year through the 
Orontes River and the bordering El Kebir River (FAO Aquastat, 2008).
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of the annual flow which amounts to 1.2 BCM at the Syrian-Turkish border 
(Aquastat, 2008: 4).
Unlike the rest of the country, harnessing the water of the Orontes started during 
the French Mandate (1930s). In 1937, reconstruction of the ancient Qattineh 
Dam was initiated in order to regulate the flow and increase the irrigation 
capacity of the Orontes (Aquastat, 2008: 3). In terms of water use, the Orontes 
River constitutes the second most important river in Syria after the Euphrates, 
providing 20% of the country’s total estimated water use volume. Agriculture 
is the largest water user, consuming about 1,977 MCM/year (77% of total water 
use), followed by domestic water use at 9% and industry at 8%. Average annual 
groundwater use for irrigation (1,111 MCM or 56%) exceeded surface water use 
(886 MCM or 44%) during the period between 1992 and 2009.
Since the 1950s Syria has intensively developed water resources in the Orontes 
Basin. First large dams in Syria were constructed on the Orontes, at Rastan 
and Mhardeh in 1960 (Aquastat, 2008: 3). This was further accelerated with 
Decree No. 3 of 1972, which initiated the construction of multipurpose dams. 
Over the years Syria has built 41 dams in the basin (Aquastat, 2008: 3).  The 
total reservoir capacity of all dams in the basin reached about 950 MCM in 
2006. The Rastan, Qattineh, Zeita and Mhardeh Dams have the largest storage 
capacity.
Two main agricultural areas in Syria are supplied with water from the Orontes: 
the region between Homs and Hama and the Al-Ghab region. The latter was 
systematically drained from the 1950s onwards to reclaim land for irrigated 
agriculture. The Orontes riverbed was enlarged and deepened, and dams were 
built to regulate the flow of the river and to provide water for irrigation. The 
Al-Ghab Project was carried out between 1958 and 1967 and covered 46,000 
ha. An area of about 70,000 ha is now being irrigated as part of this project, 
consuming around 330 MCM/year of reservoir water and another 150 MCM/
year of groundwater. The region between Homs and Hama, on the other 
hand, is partly supplied from the Qattineh Lake via the Homs-Hama canal, 
providing water to an area of about 23,000 ha. Since the reservoir does not 
meet the demand, it is supplemented by groundwater wells, which irrigate 
another 20,000 ha in this part of the basin. The total irrigated area in the 
Orontes Basin in Syria has increased from approximately 155,000 ha in 1989 
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(Aquastat, 2008: 3), to 200,000 ha in 1992 and 215,000 ha in 2008 (Aquastat, 
2008: 3), while occasionally exceeding 250,000 ha in the period between 2004 
and 2008. On average, an area of about 97,000 ha (43%) is irrigated by surface 
water and 130,000 ha (57%) by groundwater. Part of the groundwater used is 
derived from fossil aquifers. The extent of the pressure on these resources, 
particularly in the Ghab region, puts the sustainability of water resources in 
the whole Orontes River Basin at risk (Hamade and Tabet, 2013: 56). Another 
region which significantly increased the use of groundwater for irrigation 
purposes is the Province of Idlib (Aquastat, 2008: 3).
The intensification of water use in the Orontes Basin in Syria has raised the 
question of long-term water sustainability. Water tables in some parts of the 
western Orontes Basin have dropped as much as 57 m in 10 years (FAO, 2003: 
342). The total irrigation water need in the Syrian part of the Orontes Basin is 
indicated in the amount of 3,586 BCM (Wakil, 1993: 20), a number well above 
the annual discharge capacity of the Orontes.
The Orontes Basin is considered one of the country’s most disturbed 
hydrological ecosystems. Apart from agriculture-based nitrate and phosphate 
pollution, industrial wastewater is discharged into the streams with limited 
or no treatment. Water quality is also threatened by domestic wastewater 
discharge in many parts of the basin (UN-ESCWA and BGR, 2013: 236-237).
3.2.3 Downstream (Turkey)
The Orontes river system constitutes the main watercourse of the Hatay and 
Kilis provinces in the Eastern Mediterranean region of Turkey. The Amik Plain 
in the Hatay province is a significant agricultural area in the Turkish part of 
the basin.
Because of the frequent flooding of towns and villages in the Amik Plain due to 
insufficient natural drainage canals, the authorities decided to drain the Amik 
Lake in the early 1940s. Draining of the Lake by the State Hydraulic Works of 
Turkey (DSI, Turkish acronym) started in the 1950s and was completed in the 
early 1970s. Hence, the Amik Plain became an important agricultural area of 
the Eastern Mediterranean region of Turkey, covering an area of 31,000 ha. 
However, flooding and increased soil salinity - negatively affecting agricultural 
productivity - have become two major concerns in the area due to problems 
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in the drainage works, particularly those executed in the 1970s (Kibaroglu et 
al., 2005: 69).
The most noteworthy dams in the Turkish part of the Orontes Basin are the 
Yarseli and Tahtakopru Dams, both located on tributaries of the Orontes. 
There are also two water development projects under construction and six 
in the investigation phase. These projects are designed to regulate the flow 
of the river system in order to provide water for irrigation and domestic use, 
to generate hydropower and to protect lands and settlements from floods 
(Kibaroglu et al., 2005: 69). 
Irrigated agriculture in the Turkish part of the basin covers, according to the 
Turkish Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs (2004: 116), an area of more 
than 125,000 ha. Based on DSI exploratory surveys, the total area that can 
be irrigated by the Orontes river system within Turkey is estimated around 
225,000 ha (DSI, 1958).
3.3 Transboundary water issues: claims - counter claims, 
negotiations and treaties 
There are a number of bilateral water agreements involving Turkey, Syria or 
Lebanon, the earliest of which date back to the French mandate (over Lebanon 
and Syria) in the early 1920s. The issue of supplying water for irrigation is the 
biggest priority in the basin as reflected in the agreements. However, to date, 
there is no agreement involving all three riparians.   
3.3.1 Syria-Lebanon
Negotiations between Lebanon and Syria on the Orontes began as early as 
1940. In 1962 a Syrian-Lebanese joint committee was established to deal with 
the Orontes, allocating an annual water amount of 100 MCM to the Hermel 
and Ka’a regions in Lebanon. In 1968, the committee decided to re-consider 
the annual water needs of both countries. Syria and Lebanon decided in 
1972 to allocate 80 MCM/year to Lebanon, but this agreement never became 
operative (Comair et al., 2013: 134; Salha, 1995: 25-30). 
Finally, on 20 September 1994 the two countries signed the “Bilateral Agreement 
Concerning the Usage and Sharing of the Waters of the Al-Asi River (Orontes) 
between the Syrian Arab Republic and the Lebanese Republic” which formally 
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allocated 80 MCM/year to Lebanon and 340 MCM/year to Syria. In case of a 
fall in annual discharge of the Orontes below 400 MCM/year, Lebanon’s share 
would be proportionately reduced. The management of the headspring and 
river flow was settled in the agreement and a technical committee composed 
of experts from both countries was formed in order to control and manage 
the Orontes headwaters in the Lebanese part of the river basin. The works, 
however, were to be financed solely by Syria. In this agreement the Orontes 
water resources are considered “common waters” (Canatan, 2003: 82). 
Downstream Turkey was totally excluded from this agreement leading to 
criticism among the Turkish bureaucracy and the general public. Turkey 
was neither notified nor consulted in the negotiation process (Salha, 1995). 
On the implementation level the agreement does not truly comply with the 
international water law framework, namely the basic principles of the 1997 
UN Watercourses Convention, even though it refers to the customary water 
law principles in its wording.
3.3.2 Syria-Turkey
So far, conflicts over the use of the Orontes’ waters occurred mainly between 
Turkey (downstream) and Syria (midstream). From the Turkish point of view, 
problems are caused by agricultural water demand and planned irrigation 
projects in both countries as well as by the quality parameters of the water 
when entering Turkey. Syria, for long, did not recognize Hatay as Turkish 
territory and thus rejected any discussions over Orontes waters.11 For Syria, 
the concern is rather to control the headwaters of the Orontes River in Lebanon 
which appears to be one of the factors that contributed to the lengthy Syrian 
military involvement in Lebanon. Within this context, Syria always demanded 
that the Orontes headwaters should stay in Lebanese territory and not be given 
to Israel (Kolars et al., 1986: 262). 
Several agreements between Turkey and the French mandate over Syria during 
the 1920s and 1930s included clauses relating to the Orontes water resources 
(Caponera, 1993: 634-635). The first agreement between independent riparians 
11  Negotiations on the Friendship Dam implied Syria’s unofficial yet effective recognition of 
Turkish sovereignty over Hatay (Jörum, 2014).
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was the “Final Protocol to Determine Syria - Hatay Border Limitation” signed 
between Syria and Turkey in 1939, which stipulated that the waters of the rivers 
(i.e. Orontes, Karasu and Afrin), where they constitute the boundary between 
Syria and Turkey, will be utilized in an equal manner. There were, however, no 
further stipulations on how to use the rivers’ water resources.
In 1950, Syria approached the World Bank to receive funding for the Al-Ghab 
Project. An agreement was signed between the two parties in the same year. 
Taking account of the Turkish concerns, the World Bank convened a meeting 
between Turkish and Syrian experts in Damascus, Syria. Findings of these 
experts were summarized in an official Turkish letter to the World Bank 
concluding that Turkish territory would face frequent floods during the period 
of construction, and that the project would leave no water for Turkey during 
irrigation seasons (Caponera, 1993: 633).
In 1952 Syria and Turkey reached an agreement on the Jaghjagh and Baligh 
(Balik) Rivers, two rivers flowing from Turkey to Syria. However, this agreement 
was not ratified by the Turkish Parliament because of the concerns over Syrian 
plans for the Orontes and the actual use of the Afrin River by Syria. The Turkish 
aim was to include all rivers shared with Syria not just those flowing from and 
into Syria (Hirsch, 1956: 215). In 1962, Syria assigned the development of the 
Orontes River project to the Dutch company NEDECO. As noted by Caponera 
(1993: 634), this plan focused solely on the projects in Syria without mentioning 
the “requirements, interests and acquired rights of Turkey”. In response to this 
plan, the Turkish delegation, during a meeting involving experts from both 
riparian countries, proposed the adoption of a draft protocol calling for a river 
basin development plan concerning the whole basin in order to determine 
measures to mitigate flood hazards, to study the feasibility of constructing 
a dam at the border to irrigate the Amik Plain, and to install early warning 
systems for flood protection. This proposal was not welcomed by the Syrian 
delegation, and no agreement was reached at the meeting (Kibaroglu et al., 
2005: 69-70; Caponera, 1993: 634).
From 1983 onwards, water related talks between Syria and Turkey continued 
mainly under the mandate of a Joint Technical Committee. It soon became 
evident that negotiations between Turkey and Syria appeared to be more 
difficult than relations between Syria and Lebanon. One of the reasons for this 
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is related to conflicting views on the subject of negotiations. While Syria was 
persistently rejecting to discuss the Orontes waters with Turkey on the grounds 
of territorial claims to the Hatay province and the Orontes as a national river, 
Turkey demanded a framework for discussion taking account of all regional 
transboundary waters (including the Euphrates and Tigris). 
Since 1995, Turkey’s complaints as to the quantity of water entering Turkey 
became vociferous. According to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs the 
water quantity was reduced from 1.55 BCM to 140 MCM. Syria, on the other 
hand, advocated that the reduction in the amount of water released to Turkey 
was predominantly caused by the drought conditions, not by an increase in 
Syrian use (Shapland, 1997: 146).   
A change of tide occurred when in October 1998 the two countries signed the 
Adana Security Protocol, followed by reciprocal visits of the Syrian President 
to Turkey and the Turkish Prime Minister to Syria, as well as by the signing of 
the first Free Trade Agreement on 22 December 2004.    
4. The Orontes Friendship Dam: the Orontes from a “bone of contention”
 to a “medium of cooperation”
In the same year, during the visit of the Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan to 
Damascus in 2004, Turkey advanced the proposal for the construction of a joint 
“Friendship Dam” on the Orontes. Both sides agreed in principle to proceed 
with this project (Soylemez, 2005) and after a series of technical studies on 
topographic and geological characteristics of the region, a number of sites for 
construction of the dam were identified (Scheumann et al., 2011: 309).
Finally, on 23-24 December 2009, Turkey and Syria agreed to start the 
construction of the Friendship Dam on the Orontes River at the Turkish-
Syrian border. The agreement was reached at the first meeting of the High-
Level Strategic Cooperation Council in Damascus, which also resulted in the 
signing of 50 Memoranda of Understandings, four of which related to water 
issues.
The dam is expected to be approximately 15 m high with a capacity of 110 MCM. 
40 MCM of this capacity will be used for flood protection while the rest will be 
Science diplomacy and transboundary water management 
The Orontes River case
[ 74 ]
utilized for energy production and irrigation. Costs of construction were to 
be shared between the two riparians. It was also decided that both countries 
would install and operate flow measuring stations in the area serving as early 
warning systems for flood protection. The foundation of the dam was laid on 
February 7, 2011. The initial plan was to finish the main body of the dam in one 
year, and the hydroelectric plant and irrigation systems in two years (Hurriyet, 
2011), but the outbreak of internal unrest in Syria followed by the deterioration 
in Turkish-Syrian relations caused the project to be suspended.  
Notwithstanding the fact that the completion of the dam will take some years 
due to the internal situation in Syria, the signing of an official protocol on the 
Orontes waters was a real breakthrough in Turkish-Syrian hydro-politics and 
also in broader political relations. For decades, Syria did not recognize the 
Turkish-Syrian political border crossed by the Orontes, maintaining territorial 
claims to the Turkish province of Hatay (historically known as Alexandretta). 
The signing of the protocol implied the recognition of the border by Syria. 
Also, for decades, Turkey had demanded regulation of the water flow of the 
Orontes River which had often been fluctuating, causing severe floods and 
droughts in downstream towns and villages in Turkey. Yet, Syria never agreed 
to build water development structures at the border, arguing that the Orontes 
is a national river. In this respect, the Protocol of December 2009 marks a 
drastic change in Syria’s attitude. In fact, there can be flourishing cooperation 
between otherwise hostile riparian states after their agreement to build joint 
dams on common borders.12
5. Conclusion
This chapter first analyzed how Turkey’s transboundary water policy is 
founded on its officially declared basic principles. Turkey’s transboundary 
water policy is formulated in accordance with national socio-economic 
development goals and determined by its specific geographical and historical 
12  The Arpacay Dam between Turkey and Armenia (former USSR) built in the 1970s, and the Lesotho 
Highlands Project between South Africa and Lesotho constitute two examples of such endeavors. 
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context. The transboundary water policy has been mainly planned and 
implemented by governmental institutions, in particular the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MoFA), specifically with the initiation of the GAP project in the 
early 1980s. Other concerned ministries and non-governmental institutions 
have attempted to provide technical and intellectual input to the policy 
formulation. Transformation of the water bureaucracy had also an impact on 
the foreign policy initiatives such as the signing of the bilateral Memoranda 
of Understandings with Syria and Iraq by the keen initiatives of the Ministry 
of Environment and Forestry. All in all, the MoFA has articulated the main 
principles of the transboundary water policies, some of which highly inspired 
by customary international law and treaty practice.
In the second part, transboundary water issues in the Orontes River Basin are 
presented with its geographical and hydrological features. Water development 
and use by the riparians are explained by highlighting the fact that irrigation is 
the major competitive user in the basin while there is still potential to develop 
the river basin by constructing multi-purpose dams such as the attempted 
Friendship Dam on the Turkish-Syrian border, yet halted due to the internal 
conflict in Syria. This part also discussed transboundary water politics in the 
region by delineating negotiation processes and treaties, mainly taking place 
at bilateral levels (Syria-Lebanon and Syria-Turkey). 
It has been demonstrated in this chapter that, despite the existence of a number of 
cooperative initiatives between countries of the basin, a tri-partite cooperative 
framework is lacking. Furthermore, prevailing cooperation attempts in the 
river basin need to be more inclusive in terms of different segments of society. 
In particular, women, who play crucial roles in water management practices, 
should be incorporated in cooperative arrangements among riparians.
The internal conflict in Syria, which erupted in spring 2011, had devastating 
impacts on water use and management in the Orontes Basin. Today, the Orontes 
Basin comprises some of the most conflict-affected areas in Syria. Springs, 
wells and water networks are strategic for territorial control by either pro-
regime or opposition forces, and have been deliberately targeted to interrupt 
water supply in certain sectors. Two-thirds of the four million inhabitants of 
the basin have been displaced over the past three years (Jaubert, 2014: 6). 
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This chapter is not intended to analyze the implications of ongoing conflict 
on water use and management in Syria. However, our study and observations 
bring us to the conclusion that transboundary water cooperation will be 
essential to respond to the urgent needs of communities in Syria. From a post-
conflict perspective, rehabilitation of the domestic and agricultural water 
infrastructure will be a priority to ensure the sustainable return of displaced 
populations. Beyond emergency relief interventions, the prioritization and 
allocation of resources for reconstruction will be determinant factors in 
the reconciliation process. Hence, in these processes, co-riparians, namely 
Turkey and Lebanon may play critical and constructive roles for recovery in 
the Syrian water sector as well as maintaining water and food security.
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